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Abstract 
During the last ten years, the Government of The Lao PDR, a communist country, has taken bold 
steps towards a market economy, creating a policy environment for the emergence of a demand-
driven system of microfinance. Such a system should be based on the cultural traditions of Laos 
in which, above all, there is (a) a strong sense of solidarity within the community and (b) women 
play a crucial role in microfinance. It is suggested that an evolving Laotian system of 
micro finance might consist of one or several of the following components: 
(1) A microfinance section in the central bank to provide an appropriate policy, legal and 
supervisory framework; 
(2) Commercial banks as microfinance wholesalers and retailers - to be reformed through five 
strategies: 
(a) an incentive strategy: converting branches or sub-branches into profit centers which 
mobilize their own resources and provide credit at their own risk; 
(b) a sound banking strategy: geared to institutional viability and sustainable financial 
services; 
(c) a linkage strategy: linking banks with non-formal financial institutions/financial SHGs; 
( d) an outreach strategy: extending the banking services to increasing numbers of women 
and men, including the poor; and 
( e) a transformation strateg: transforming branches or sub-branches branches or sub-
branches into autonomous financial institutions owned and managed by local people; 
(3) A network of semiformal, and eventually formal, women's village banks for both women and 
men; and 
(4) Savings and credit associations functioning as informal self-help banks of 
micro businesswomen. 
Based on deeply entrenched cultural traditions, women have the potential of becoming the 
microfinance bankers of Laos, building viable institutions with sustainable financial services for 
all segments of the population. 
ii 
1 The Search for a Laotian System of Micro finance 
Laos needs a system of microfinance that offers three types of services: microsavings deposit 
facilities, microinsurance, and access to microcredit. Policymakers, institutional decision-makers 
and local people now face the challenge of building a range of viable microfinance institutions 
that offer these services in a sustainable way to all segments of the population. 
Four types of institutions are instrumental in that process, two of which fall into the formal and 
two into the nonformal financial sector: 
- the central bank as regulatory authority with overall responsibility for the development 
of micro finance; 
- the state commercial banks as retailers and wholesalers of micro finance; 
- the Lao Women's Union in cooperation with international NGOs and donors which has 
the potential of extending a network of women's village banks as part of the semiformal 
financial sector into every community; 
informal savings and credit groups which might have the potential of evolving into the 
microbusinesswomen's informal self-help banks in urban areas. 
The potential of each of these institutions needs to be explored; and ways have to be found to 
fully activate that potential. 
One of the most striking aspects of the emerging landscape of microfinance in Laos is the key 
role of women within the cultural traditions of Laos. They produce cash crops; they are the small 
traders and microentrepreneurs; they hold the family purse; they are in charge of saving for 
investments and emergencies; they are the moneylenders; they are the innovators in urban 
informal finance; and they have organized in women's groups which have started to lay the 
foundation for a network of micro finance institutions throughout the country. What is thus their 
function in building the future system of microfinance in Laos? Will their role be confined to that 
of recipients of savings, credit and insurance services? Or will they also be among the providers 
of microfinance services to both men and women, as owners and managers of local financial 
institutions? And within the Laotian solidarity of the sexes, will they decide to be co-owners and 
co-managers together with their men, or will they stick to the tradition of women's trusteeship 
over money? And finally, what kind of support will be needed to activate their potential for the 
benefit of all segments of society? 
2 The Background of Microfinance: Society and Economy of Laos 
Population: Laos is a small, sparsely populated country of 4.6 million people, with an average 
population density of 19 persons/km2 (Annex I). They live in 11,640 communities with less than 
400 inhabitants on average. 92% of the communities are rural (see Table 2). Two thirds of the 
population are engaged in subsistence agriculture outside the market economy. 
Quality of life: Measured in terms of social indicators, Laos ranks among the lowest in Asia. Poor 
sanitation and nutrition in most of rural Laos lead to poor health, low life expectancy and high 
levels of infant and maternal mortality. School enrollment and literacy rates are low. (Annex 2) 
Poverty: 46% of the people of Laos are poor, comprising 1.8 million rural and 0.25 million urban 
poor. Opportunities for diversification and market integration are limited. 
Politics and administration: After a prolonged liberation struggle, the Lao People's 
Revolutionary Party, LPRP, proclaimed the Lao PDR in 1975 and established today's system of 
communist one-party rule. In recent years, political stability and economic liberalization became 
the two main pillars on which modem Laos is to be built. Policymakers now face two major 
challenges: one is effective administrative penetration and decentralization; the other one is a . 
balance of policymaking at the top and bottom-up participation. 
Social organization: There are about 65 ethnic groups in Laos. The dominant group is that of the 
lowland Lao Loum who grow paddy in the Mekong river valley, comprising 68% of the 
population. The upland Lao Theung, about 22% of the population, practice slash-and-bum 
agriculture in the hills and on the mountain slopes. The Lao Soung, among them the Hmong, 
about 10% of the population, live in remote mountain areas and are politically least integrated. 
For the majority of Laotians, the village is the center of human relations where people are 
socialized into solidarity and harmony. The political system of the village is basically democratic, 
built on consensus rather than majority rule. Household, kinship, neighborhood, self-help groups 
and village community are the basic units around which village life revolves. 
Economy: With a per capita income of US$355, Laos is one of the least developed countries. In 
recent years, GDP has been growing consistently at rates above 5%. But little of that growth has 
been felt in most rural areas. Agriculture accounts for 55% of GDP and 89% of employment. 
Crop failures and food shortages are frequent. Through foreign exchange and trade reforms, the 
Government has enhanced the country's new outward orientation and opened up export markets, 
particularly for electricity, garments and timber. However, rapid expansion is impeded by 
constraints in the social and physical infrastructure. (Annex 3) 
Structural adjustment and reform: After ten years of socialist central planning and economic 
decline, the Government, in 1986, boldly decided to embark on the making of a market economy. 
Through NEM, the New Economic Mechanism, a series of reform measures were introduced, 
substituting competitive market forces for the command economy. Among the crucial new 
measures were the privatization of land use rights and public enterprises and the liberalization of 
prices. Assisted by structural adjustment credits, the Government successfully initiated 
macroeconomic reforms, with dramatic results in terms of GDP growth, stable exchange rates, 
fiscal constraints, a drastic decline of the inflation rate and export diversification. Since 1990, the 
Government has substantially reformed the financial sector. It converted the former State Bank 
into a central bank and a number of state commercial banks, recapitalized them, admitted private 
sector banks and gradually liberalized interest rates. Further progress has been impeded by the 
reluctance of administrative and institutional decisionmakers to fully implement national policy 
decisions at the local level. 
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Currency, public finance and economic stability: The decade before 1987 was characterized by 
the free fall of the national currency, the kip; the decade since 1987 by the determined fight for 
economic stability. In 1987, with the onset of liberalization, the Government initiated a policy of 
inflation control by abandoning multiple exchange rates and by drastically devaluating the kip. 
Since then, the Government weathered two inflationary storms and gained increasing competence 
over destabilizing forces. When salary and price hikes contributed to an inflationary increase in 
the money supply, the Government, with international backing, reversed the process. Until 1994, 
the inflation rate stayed below 10%. In early 1995, the demand-pull of rapid liquidity and credit 
expansion again led to price instability. Through a policy of tight money and related measures, 
imports became more expensive and exporting more attractive. The current account deficit fell, 
and so did the inflation rate. Both the Bank of the Lao PDR and the IMF agree that prudent 
monetary and credit policies seem to work in Laos. 
Table 1: 
Year 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
March 1996 
Inflation rates (CPI) in percent and official exchange rates (kip/US$), 
1990-1995 (annual averages, except March 1996) 
Inflation rate Exchange rate 
40.4 709 
13.5 702 
9.9 715 
6.3 716 
6.8 718 
19.4 815 
925 
Development assistance and coordination: In recent years, the budget deficit has been fully 
financed by donor grants and loans amounting to US$ 232.5 million in 1995. Both the 
composition and the management of foreign assistance have been erratic. Through informal 
gatherings, UNDP has made some attempts at coordinating external assistance. 
3 The regulatory environment of microfinance 
The monetary policy framework: Since its enactment as a central bank in 1990, the Bank of Lao 
PDR, BOL, has pursued a policy of gradual deregulation and prudential intervention. Despite 
shortcomings in autonomy and experience, BOL has been remarkably successful in shaping the 
monetary policy framework of the emerging market economy. 
The interest rate regime: In order to provide incentives for the mobilization of savings and the 
effective allocation of scarce resources, BOL has gradually deregulated interest rates. The floor 
on deposit rates has recently been raised from 12% to 16%, while the ceiling on lending rates has 
been lifted. However, the state banks which are dominant in rural and microfinance appear to act 
as administrative bodies supplying preferential credit to target beneficiaries, rather than financial 
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intermediaries between savers and borrowers. Under political and administrative influence, their 
market rates do not exceed 28% per year, while semiformal exchange houses and informal credit 
houses charge real market rates of 5-20% per month. In actual fact, the interest rate structure of 
the Agricultural Promotion Bank, APB, the largest provider of microfinance, remains inverted, 
with average deposit rates exceeding its lending rates. Under such conditions, banks refrain from 
mobilizing savings and restrict their lending. Instead, they continue to depend on government and 
donor funds. For deregulation to be fully effective, the volume of subsidized credit programs 
needs to be drastically curtailed. At the same time, banks must be free to charge whatever interest 
rates are needed to cover their costs, including the costs of special services to remote areas and to 
the informal microeconomy. 
The legal .framework: The legal foundations of the present banking structure are laid down in the 
banking law of June 1990, which separated central and commercial banking functions. Financial 
institutions, comprising BOL, commercial banks including private banks and foreign bank 
branches, non-bank financial institutions and credit cooperatives, were regulated by decree in 
January 1992. The mandate for rural and microfinance practically lies with the state commercial 
banks. They alone have rural branches. After the collapse of the former state cooperatives, a new 
network of credit cooperatives has not yet emerged. There is no other legislation that would 
permit the establishment of small local financial institutions owned by shareholders, communities 
or corporate bodies. Nor is there any form of official recognition for self-help groups or informal 
financial institutions. What is needed is a recognized system of microfinance that permits the 
simultaneous existence, and the gradual transformation, of informal, semiformal and formal 
microfinance institutions. 
Guidance and supervision: The formal financial sector is supervised by BOL. As a new 
institution, it lacks the experience of effective supervision over institutional viability and 
sustainability. Supervision and guidance of the nonformal financial sector is missing, resulting in 
a complete absence of any standards of financial management and sound practices. To promote 
the establishment of competing types of local microfinance institutions and provide adequate 
guidance and supervision, second-tier regulatory authorities are needed, which in tum are to be 
supervised by BOL. 
4 The market for microfinance 
Market segmentation: Financial markets in Laos are segmented into a nonmonetized rural 
subsistence economy, an undermonetized microeconomy of mostly informal microenterprises, 
and a small formal sector of government agencies and larger enterprises. The potential market of 
microfinance comprises over 90% of the adult population, half of them poor. This includes a 
labor force of about two million, half of them women; some 700,000 households; 11,000 small 
communities; and 150,000 microenterprises, with over 100,000 of them spread all over rural Laos 
and only 13% in the inner urban areas (Table 2). 
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Table 2: Small and microenterprises by market segment, 1995 
Market segment No. of Employment Population Density Ann. revenue in 
enterprises per 1000 mn. Kip**) 
Rural non-Mekong 69,724 125,859 2,378,181 29 2.2 
Rural Mekong 43,138 71,234 1,647,313 26 2.3 
Semi-urban 14,403 25,350 301,168 48 2.0 
Urban non-market 9,709 20,954 315,523 58 10.7 
Urban markets 8,748 14,456 *) *) 6.3 
Urban industrial 305 725 12,084 25 12.9 
Total 146,028 258,577 4,654,269 31 
*) Enterprises and inhabitants in the urban markets are included in the urban (non-market) figures 
* *) Mean annual revenue of small and microenterprises in million kip 
Source: GTZ-MIH I 996 
The demand for microfinance: In a largely nonmonetized subsistence economy, demand for 
financial services is an elusive concept. Governments and donors vastly exaggerate the demand 
for credit. In practice, though not in theory, rural savings, hitherto the forgotten half of rural 
finance, are neglected. Experience from other countries indicates that, with equal access to both 
deposit and credit facilities, savers tend to outnumber borrowers by a ratio of 5: 1, or, if they are 
poor, of 10: 1 and above. The demand for microinsurance, the forgotten third of microfinance, is 
generally ignored. 
Microsavings: Laotians tend to be risk-averse and savings-oriented. Historically, women are in 
charge of the family purse and of savings. According to the UNDP/UNCDF rural microfinance 
survey of 1996, 91 % of households hold financial savings, mostly in cash, averaging US$87. 
91 % also hold nonfinancial savings amounting to $565: 82% held in livestock and 18% in gold 
and silver (Table 3). 
Table 3: 
Laos, 1996 
Type of savings 
Financial savings: 
Bank deposits 
Informal group 
deposits 
Cash 
Asset loans supplied 
Nonfinancial savings: 
Precious metals 
Livestock 
Total savings 
Financial and nonfinancial savings among rural households in 
Percent of households Average amount in kip 
90.8 
0.5 
0.3 
87.9 
4.4 
91.3 
96.6 
80,498 
7,578 
2,387 
59,068 
8,253 
525,696 
92,725 
432,971 
606, 195 
Source: UNDPIUNCDF 1996 
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There is surprisingly little difference between upland households and those in the Mekong valley 
(Table 4): 
Table 4: Financial and nonfinancial savings by market segment among 
rural and semiurban households in Laos (in percent), 1996 
Form of savings Rural upland Rural Mekong Provine 'l capital Semi urban All 
Bank deposits 5 7 1 
Informal deposits 1 1 0.5 
Cash 9 11 9 17 10 
Precious metals 14 14 18 27 16 
Livestock 77 74 68 48 73 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: UNDPIUNCDF 1996 
173 ,000 kip ($186) of savings are in liquid form or gold and silver. If we tentatively assume that, 
with savings deposit facilities offered, 30% of that amount would be monetized and deposited 
during the first year and that this demand would grow at an annual rate of 15%, then, at the end of 
the fifth year, the actual demand for depositing savings would amount to kip 91,000 kip per 
household, 5.9 million kip per community, 530 million kip per district and 66 billion kip 
nationwide. Approximately half of that demand would come from the microenterprise sector. 
(Table 5) 
Table 5: Rough estimates of the demand for depositing savings among rural and 
semiurban households in Laos (in kip) 
Level 
Household 
Community of 65 households 
District of 90 communities 
National 
Probable range 
Small and microenterprises only 
Probable range 
Source: Own estimates 
1st year 
51,900 
3.4 million 
306 million 
3 7 .5 billion 
18 billion 
33-131 billion 
16-64 billion 
5th year 
91,000 
5.9 million 
530 million 
66 billion 
32 billion 
Microcredit: According to the microfinance survey, 11.5% of rural households are endebted in 
cash. The average loan outstanding is about 300,000 kip. 4% of the households were found to 
supply credit informally to an average of three borrowers (UNDP/UNCDF 1996). 
In the microenterprise survey, it was found that credit is not an important source of 
microenterprise finance. 30% had loans outstanding, averaging 200,000 kip, more than half of 
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this from family members. Only about 5% had a loan from formal or informal institutional 
sources. Almost 75% reported finance as a major start-up problem. Among the current problems 
of established enterprises, marketing ranks first. (Table 6) 
The actual demand of households for credit hinges on their ability to save, invest and repay. It 
will grow with the emergence of markets, financial intermediaries and internal resource 
mobilization, which in tum grow with access to credit. Given the dearth of formal and informal 
financial institutions, there is only little scope for the articulation of the demand for credit. 
Therefore, quantitative estimates are problematic. Most average loan sizes in NGO programs 
range from 10,000 kip to 50,000 kip and in some cases up to 120,000 kip. Given a savings-driven 
approach to financial institution-building, the overall demand for credit should stay close to the 
demand for depositing savings as estimated above. 
Box 1: Portrait ofa well-to-do farmer 
Mr. Sadome is a moderately well-to-do farmer who lives in a small village in Vientiane Province about 60 km 
from the city. During our visit to a sub-branch of the Agricultural Promotion Bank on October 1, 1996, we met 
him in the front-yard of his house. 
Mr. Sadome produces most of what is needed for the subsistence of his family on his own farm. Living in the 
more monetized center of the country, he is also part of the emerging market economy. He has four ha of land: 
three ha for sticky rice cultivation and one ha of fruit trees. He grows bananas, coconuts and fruits. He also does 
some fish farming and raises cows and chicken for sale. 
Mr. Sadome has been a customer of APB since the bank opened its sub-branch in 1993. In 1995, he took a 
subsidized loan from APB to buy chicken feed for his chicken farm of about 100 chicken. This was his first bank 
loan. The loan period was eight months. It was repaid on time without any delay. 
On May 1, 1996, Mr. Sadome obtained a three-year tractor loan of one million kip from APB at 8% interest p.a. 
The principal is to be paid back in six-months instalments; interest payments are due monthly. So far Mr. 
Sadome has met his obligations on time. As they are not channeled through groups, tractor loans were not among 
the five agricultural loan products mentioned during the meeting at the sub-branch. 
The price of the hand-tractor was 2.7 million kip. This was financed through an APB loan of 1.0 million kip and 
own savings of 1. 7 million kip. Mr. Sadome had accumulated the 1. 7 million kip, which he used for the self-
financed part of the tractor purchase, over a period of two years in an APB savings account. Mr. Sadome's 
present savings deposits with APB amount to 300,000 kip. He keeps his savings, with a nominal yield of 10%, 
with APB; other banks that would pay a higher interest rate are too far away. Voluntary passbook savings were 
not among the financial products mentioned at the APB sub-branch. 
The tractor is driven by Mr. Sadome's son. He uses it to transport produce to the market and to plow rice fields. It 
is also rented out and generates cash income. Mr. Sadome calculates that gross earnings from the tractor amount 
to about 600,000 kip per year and costs to about 150,000 kip, leaving a profit of about 450,000 to which the 
value of the produce sold in the market has to be added. It appears that Mr. Sadome has forgotten to calculate his 
interest payments are part of the costs; nor has he made provision for the annual depreciation. 
Mr. Sadome is a small farmer. He is also a microentrepreneur offering transportation and ploughing services. Mr. 
Sadome has profited from the savings deposit facilities offered by APB and from access to subsidized program 
loans. The savings account has enabled him to accumulate savings for the self-financed part of the tractor 
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purchase that might otherwise have been wasted. The tractor loan has enabled him to finance the remaining 
portion of the investment that might otherwise have been beyond his capacity. Given the low real returns on his 
savings, Mr. Sadome had not earned much from his earlier savings. At the given inflation rate which is above his 
interest earnings, he presently even loses part of the value of his savings. However, at the same time he benefits 
from the low interest rates offered by APB, which are far below the real value of the loans. It is not clear whether 
he could have afforded the tractor at genuine rural market rates of interest. 
Table 6: 
Source 
Supplier 
Family 
Friends 
Moneylenders 
Banks 
Total % with liabilities 
Source: GTZJMJH 1996:40 
Current liabilities among microentrepreneurs in Laos, 1995 
Percent with 
liability 
19.9 
8.2 
2.0 
4.7 
3.6 
29.9 
Average value of liability 
Amount 
30,804 
103,088 
20,193 
8,038 
35,252 
197,375 
Percent 
15.6 
52.2 
10.2 
4.1 
17.9 
100.0 
In qualitative terms, a large proportion of the population has a demand for microsavings as a 
source of self-financing; only few have a demand for microcredit. Initial credit demand is for 
small loan sizes, short loan periods and brief installment periods. The demand grows with the 
enterprise, resulting in a need for repeat loans of increasing size. At the same time, the self-
financing capacity grows, creating a demand for combined savings and installment collection 
services. 
Microinsurance: In the subsistence economy, insurance needs are covered by reciprocal exchange 
relations and mutual obligations, which escape quantification. Based on experience elsewhere, we 
might expect that the demand for microinsurance will evolve through the following stages: the 
demand for self-help groups to respond to social obligations and emergencies; the demand for 
nonformal and formal local savings institutions providing immediate access to savings as need 
arises; and the demand for loan protection through life, health and livestock insurance as part of 
credit risk management. Microresources may be first mobilized through ad-hoc contributions in 
the neighborhood and allocated on the basis of reciprocity; then through regular contributions and 
allocated in fixed amounts by self-help groups; then through regular contributions to informal 
institutions and allocated in the form of interest-free loans; and finally through regular 
contributions and interest payments, to be allocated in the form of interest-bearing loans. 
Institutions involved may gradually progress from informal and semiformal to formal. They 
would eventually offer all three services: microsavings, microcredit and microinsurance, with 
linkages between them. 
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5 The institutional infrastructure of microfinance 
5.1 Formal finance 
The banking sector: The banking sector comprises BOL as the central bank, eight state-owned 
deposit money banks with a total of 17 branches, two joint venture banks, seven foreign bank 
branches and a representative office of Standard Chartered Bank. In 1994 the Government 
relieved the state banks of their inherited bad debts and established an adequate 
Table 7: Assets of the banking sector, 1990-1995 (in billion kip) 
Institution 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 *1995 
Bank of Lao PDR 99.0 120.9 149.1 170.7 184.6 n.a. 
State-owned banks: 91.9 102.l 130.2 176.5 201.8 n.a. 
Nakhomluang Bank 31.5 31.4 33.2 15.4 n.a. 
Settathirath Bank 9.5 11.4 15.3 22.7 n.a. 
Phaktay Bank 11.6 16.0 14.3 18.4 20.4 
Lao May Bank 6.3 7.6 14.6 17.9 19.9 
Lanexang Bank 5.8 7.7 10.2 11.5 18.9 
Aroune May Bank 1.7 2.3 2.9 3.4 n.a. 
Agricultural Promotion Bank 6.9 16.1 39.6 
Banque du Commerce Ext. Lao 35.7 53.9 79.1 96.5 n.a. 
Private banks: 3.2 5.1 13.4 57.3 78.9 n.a. 
Joint Development Bank 3.2 5.1 9.1 14.1 18.6 
Vientiane Commercial Bank 4.2 9.0 8.8 
Muen Lao Bank n.a. 4.0 
Bangkok Bank 6.0 13.l 
Krung Thai Bank 4.6 6.6 
Siam Commercial Bank 9.7 11.7 
Thai Farmers Bank 5.4 7.2 
Thai Military Bank 8.5 9.1 
Total gross assets 194.1 228.1 292.6 404.4 465.3 
Growth rates in percent: 
State-owned banks 89.8 11.1 27.5 35.6 14.4 
Private banks 81.0 62.2 160.4 328.2 37.7 
Source for 1990-1994: ADB 1996:59 
'Figures start with the first year of operation. In the absence of international accounting and reporting standards, 
they frequently differ between sources. 
Figures for 1995, from inofficial reports, are either not available or provisional. 
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capital base. The banking sector has seen a complete reversal of its portfolio structure, with 
private sector loans as a proportion of total domestic credit reaching 82% in 1995. Most banks 
have emerged during the past five years, after the mono-tier banking system of the previous 
centrally planned economy was abolished. (Table 7) From the former State Bank, the state 
commercial banks have inherited two weaknesses: the lack of experience in sound banking; and 
an aversity to resource mobilization. 
Rural finance: The rural banking sector is dominated by six government-owned banks: APB, 
established in 1993 as the prime agricultural lender with a national outreach; and five regional 
banks, which grew out of departments of the former State Bank in 1990 and 1991. Only they are 
authorized to collect rural savings. The delivery structure of APB comprises 16 branches and 90 
sub-branches for a total of 18 provinces and 133 districts. The five regional banks add another 
twelve branches. Regarding outreach, there is agreement that not more than 15% of all 
households in Laos have access to formal finance; that women, who play a focal role in 
nonformal finance, are mainly involved as keepers of the family purse; that access to savings 
deposit facilities is far more restricted than access to credit; and that those households with access 
to formal finance are far from having all their financial needs covered. 
Assets: 
Reserves 
Cash 
BOL deposits 
Table 8: 
banks, 
Loans outstanding 
Foreign 
Government securities 
Other 
Total 
Liabilities: 
Current deposits 
Term & savings deposits 
Government deposits 
Credit f. monetary auth' s 
Other 
Capital: 
Capital and reserves 
Provisions, profit & loss 
Selected balance sheet data from four state-owned commercial 
December 1995 (in million kip) 
APB Lanexang Paktai Lao may 
1045 3256 644 1976 
727 267 465 610 
319 2990 179 1367 
17302 6389 6662 7150 
49 450 1014 2042 
700 2134 2685 2046 
19467 3415 8742 4747 
39609 18901 20391 19938 
1330 3046 576 3705 
340 3917 2166 4384 
87 781 944 2659 
16676 2256 2066 2443 
18956 295 12014 2714 
1175 2506 1705 1980 
988 964 1042 1010 
187 1542 663 970 
Source: Consultancy reports. The data, which are based on bank and BOL reports, are to be considered as 
indicative only. Data from different sources vary widely. 
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Box 2: Microfinance in a sub-branch of the Agricultural Promotion Bank (Oct. 1, 1996) 
The sub-branch, at a distance of approximately 60 km from Vientiane, was opened in August 1993. It has a staff 
of six, including two women who work as accountants and three loan officers who go out to the field on their 
own motorcycles. The sub-branch is not a profit unit. It prepares no balance sheet nor a profit and loss statement. 
Data on financial transactions by the sub-branch are entered into handwritten ledgers. There is no systematic 
monitoring at this level. All important information is kept either in the branch or in the headoffice. The manager 
has no information on arrears. 
Banking at the sub-branch level is comprised of program activities for defined purposes and target groups. The 
sub-branch acts as a credit channel and not as a financial intermediary between savers and borrowers. Loan funds 
are supplied by the headoffice. The contingent for the sub-branch is 300 million kip. There is no information on 
the actual amount of loans outstanding. 
The sub-branch mobilizes resources through compulsory deposits of I 0% deducted from each Joan. The total 
volume of deposits is 15 million kip, which corresponds to 5% of the sub-branch's total lending volume. Accord-
ing to the manager, interest rates on savings deposits are 10% p.a. If correct, this would be in contradiction to the 
central bank regulation of a 16% floor on deposit rates. Others have also reported on discrepancies of vital 
information between different levels of the hierarchy. One of the major problems of the sub-branch is seen in the 
shortage of loanable funds. The manager says he finds it exceedingly difficult to attract additional savings with 
the interest rate of 10% offered by APB while other banks offer 15-18% p.a. on fixed deposits. 
There is no retail lending at the sub-branch level. The sub-branch only lends through groups, which have a 
minimum size of seven and a maximum of fifteen members. At present there are 403 informal groups with a total 
of2800 members, about 140 of them female heads of households. The average group size is seven. 
All credit at the sub-branch is agricultural and small-scale. There are five credit products of a rationed volume, 
three short-term and two medium-term, which are channeled through groups: 
• Yellow rice and sticky rice Joans of 300,000 kip per end-user, amounting to a total of 206 million kip. 
The loan period is 8 months, the annual effective interest rate 10%. Principal and interest are paid back in 
total upon the maturity of the loan 
• Cash-crop Joans of I 00,000 kip for tobacco, beans and com, amounting to 74 million kip. The loan period 
is six months, the interest rate I 0%. Principal and interest are payable at maturity 
• Animal loans of 300,000 kip for pigs, turkeys and chicken, amounting to 5 million kip. The loan period is 
one year, the interest rate 10%, payable every month. The principal is due upon maturity. 
• Buffalo loans of 500,000 kip, amounting to 5 million kip. The loan period is three years, the interest rate 
8%. Interest is due monthly, the principal upon maturity. 
• Land preparation loans of 500,000 kip, amounting to 10 million kip. The loan period is three years, the 
interest rate 8%. 
In addition, there is one retail credit product offered to individuals at branch level: tractor loans of one million 
kip each. Twelve loans were granted during the past year in seven villages within the area of the sub-branch, 
amounting to 12 million kip. The loan period is two years, the interest rate 8% p.a. The principal is to be repaid 
in semiannual installments; interest payments are due monthly. 
All six banks depend heavily on external resources. Overall deposits make up only 22% of total 
liabilities and capital. With 92%, this proportion is highest in APB. On the whole, deposit 
facilities are restricted, deposit collection services none. The total number of depositors reported 
by the six banks in 1995 is 28,000, or one in every 27 households. 
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The loan portfolio accounts for about 41 % of their assets. The total number of loan accounts (not 
customers!) reported is about 35,000, or one in every 21 households. There is no reliable 
information on portfolio quality. Some experts claim that massive defaulting is to be expected in 
the future. There appears to be little sense of urgency to improve outreach, internal resource 
mobilization and institutional viability. (Table 7) 
Bank training is provided by the Banking Training Centre of BOL, the University and in-house 
by the private banks. The Centre presently emphasizes the training of trainers. Microfinance and 
rural banking are not among the fields of training foreseen; nor are there any training services for 
institutions and programs outside the formal banking sector. 
5.2 Semiformal finance 
Lao Village Credit Associations (LVCAs): The semiformal financial sector comprises those 
institutions, programs and projects which are officially recognized but do not fall under the 
banking law, ranging from credit cooperatives to revolving funds. In Laos, semiformal finance is 
in an incipient phase, below the stage of actual institution-building. It largely rests on the 
cooperation of two types of partners: international donor agencies, which may be multilateral, 
bilateral and nongovernmental, on one side; and the Laos Women's Union, L WU, with its local 
women's groups on the other side. As a result of this cooperation, some 1650 LVCAs with a focus 
on women and the poor, have come into existence. They are set up in target villages selected by 
local government at provincial and district levels in cooperation with the donor. Joint ownership 
of the LVCAs lies with the village, the government and the donor. They are managed by a village 
committee and supervised by local government committees together with the donor agency. In 
most cases, the microfinance activities are in the form of a revolving fund attached to some other, 
overriding concern, such as health, education and training, or livestock raising. Each program 
falls under the supervision of the respective ministry in charge. 
The Lao Women's Union (LWU): LWU is the official mass organization of women with 650,000 
members, which comprises over half of the adult female population. Since 1989, it has addressed 
the needs of poor women. In recent years it has increasingly focused on households where the 
roles of women and men are intertwined. Its main fields of concentration are education and 
training, health and child care, legal rights information, and income-generating activities. 
Improving access to credit is among its main objectives for the year 2000. Over the last six years, 
its projects have extended to 3.620 villages in virtually all provinces and districts, amounting to 
1.8 billion kip. L WU has a unique delivery structure, extending from national, provincial and 
district levels, with a staff that numbered 20,000 women in 1990, all the way down, with 
volunteers in virtually all villages of Laos. All donor-funded women's projects are handled by 
L WU, which closely cooperates with the various line ministries. L WU is regarded as the best 
organized and most effective development organization in Laos with the widest delivery network. 
Major weaknesses are found in the lack of technical skills. In the field of microfinance, there is a 
severe lack of competence in financial management, intermediation between savers and 
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borrowers, and sound practices. L WH has helped to· deliver credit; it has not helped women to 
mobilize savings and build viable financial institutions at the local level. (Annex 4) 
Donor projects: There are over thirteen projects of international NGOs with L VCAs and at least 
four projects of multilateral organizations, with an outreach to about 14% of all villages in Laos. 
Total funds disbursed since 1992 amount to over US$ 6 million. It is estimated that about 80% of 
this amount was provided by the World Food Program to establish rice banks. The flow of funds 
is normally from donor agency to the Government of Lao PDR and from there through local 
government to the village. The emphasis is mostly on credit, rarely on savings. General loan 
terms and target beneficiaries are determined through an assessment of the donor agency and 
local government staff. Beneficiaries may be individuals, groups or communities. The final 
decisions over loan terms and appraisals of end-users are made by the village committee. Most 
loans are in the range of approximately US$10-100. Examples of loan purposes are livestock and 
looms. Most interest rates range from zero to 30% p.a. The average is around 10%, roughly 
equivalent to the preferential rates of the state commercial banks. (Annex 5) 
Box 3: The piggy bank - A microfinance-in-kind institution 
Most microfinance institutions promoted by NGOs are revolving funds; and most of the loans are in kind. One of 
the NGOs, the Quaker Service Laos (QSL), has been working in Laos since 1973. From 1993 onwards it has 
focused on small-scale irrigation and community development projects. QSL has provided revolving funds for 
rice mills, rice banks, buffalo banks, pig banks and chicken banks. 
The villagers start by setting up a group of some twenty participants. Every member receives a loan valued at 
66.000 kip for a pig. The loan period is two years, including a grace period of one year. The interest rate is 8% 
p.a. Repayment during the second year is in three-monthly instalments. Relying on peer pressure, a new loan is 
contingent upon full repayment of the old loan. If a member encounters a repayment problem, he brings it before 
the group which tries to find an acceptable solution: usually by granting an extension. 
The microfinance component of most donor projects consists of a rapidly decapitalizing 
revolving fund for the delivery of preferential credit in cash or kind to beneficiary groups for 
specific project activities. There are notable exceptions, among them the Sihom Project Saving 
and Credit Scheme of UNCHS, which includes a substantial savings component; and a project by 
ZOA (Netherlands) to provide equity for the establishment of so-called village banks in Vientiane 
Municipality which then mobilize their own resources. The donor-funded excursions into 
microfinance show considerable courage and promise. However, there is little awareness of sound 
microfinance principles such as mobilizing your own resources, covering your costs from the 
margin, ensuring timely repayment, and building a viable institution. There is no financial 
management training to transmit the required skills; nor is there a monitoring system to generate 
information on the results of financial operations. Sharing of emerging best practices, capacity 
and financial institution-building are among the biggest needs. 
Building a system of microfinance: With well-designed donor support, L WU might develop the 
capacity of vitally contributing to the making of a system of microfinance institutions, which 
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build on the traditional roles of women in Laos as prudent microentrepreneurs, conscientious 
savers and reliable managers of household finances. 
5.3 Informal finance 
Informal financial institutions do not appear as an important part of the social fabric of Laos. 
Their place is largely taken by small local networks of reciprocal relations and mutual obligations 
among relatives, .friends and neighbors. There is a small number of moneylenders who provide 
microloans at around 20% interest per month. This is supplemented by a very limited volume of 
supplier credit. Moneylending seems to be a female domain. 
Rotating and nonrotating savings and credit associations, which are so widespread in other parts 
of Asia, are in their incipient stage. Known as Houey, Lin Huey or Lin Ngeun, they seem to be a 
recent phenomenon emerging in urban market places. The rotation is daily, weekly or monthly, 
the membership frequently around 30. Examples of contributions found in the field, particularly 
among traders, are 1000 kip ($1) per day, 5,000 Baht ($200) per 
Box 4: Lin Huey 
Daily Lin Huey: There may be around thirty participants in a daily ROSCA, each contributing about 1000 kip. 
The first round goes to the head and organizer; the subsequent allocations are determined by the head of the Lin 
Huey. Once a participant has received the total amount, he subsequently has to pay an extra 200 kip to each 
additional recipient of the total amount as a compensation. The amount received thus increases with every round. 
Weekly or monthly Lin Huey: Contributions in weekly and monthly Lin Huey, with a life cycle far beyond that of 
a daily Lin Huey, are made in Baht, the Thai currency, which is considered a hard currency. Contributions per 
person range from about 5,000 to 10,000 Baht. The head and organizer either receives the first pot; or he gets a 
share (usually around 5%) of each round. The order of subsequent rounds is determined by secret bidding. The 
person with the highest bid gets the total, until every participant has received the total once. A bidder who wins a 
round is obligated to pay his proportional share of that amount in all subsequent rounds as a compensation in all 
subsequent rounds. 
week and 10,000 Baht ($400) per month. Fund allocation tends to be through secret bidding. 
Recipients are compensated for allocations that come late in the cycle through interest payments 
of the earlier beneficiaries. Given the prominent role played by women in these associations, they 
may be called the small businesswoman's self-help bank 
If the experience from other countries can be generalized, great benefit could be derived from 
increasing the outreach of these institutions, particularly in the microenterprise sector and among 
women; spreading their best practices; opening up avenues for their upgrading; and providing an 
adequate form of official recognition. 
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6 Women in microfinance - a special case? 
There are numerous microfinance projects in developing countries where women are largely 
ignored, particularly in small farmer development projects. There are others where they are the 
sole participants, as in the Grameen Bank and its replications. In Laos, microfinance is in its 
incipient stage. Neither formal nor informal structures of finance seem to impose restrictions on 
the future evolution of finance. Everything appears wide-open. Given the cultural setting and the 
overall economic situation, one may thus rather freely pose such questions as, Do women need 
financial institutions of their own? Should banks open special windows for women? Should 
institutions, if owned and managed by women, be restricted to women, or should they be open to 
male savers and borrowers? 
The cultural setting: Women in Laos are in an extreme position: on the one hand, many are 
illiterate; few have access to modem health care; they have large numbers of children (up to ten 
on average in some provinces); they are at high risks at their many deliveries; and nutritional 
standards are low. On the other hand, they play a prominent role in the household economy, 
particularly as microentrepreneurs and financial managers; and they are equal before the law. 
Among the Lao Lown which account for 68% of the population, women are embedded into a 
matrilineal culture. With inheritance in the female line and residency after marriage within the 
woman's family, women are ensured of considerable social and economic status, particularly in 
the framework of the rice-based farming system in the Mekong valley. The division of labor 
between the sexes is not rigid. In contrast, the Lao Theung and Lao Soung are patrilocal and 
patrilineal and emphasize male control over the means of production. Women are more confined 
to household work and microenterprise activities in the house. In all ethnic groups, women tend 
to be in charge of cash crops and marketing. This reinforces their role as family financiers, a 
function which they are expected to carry out in harmony with their husband. With 
modernization, two opposing trends can be observed: in the informal village system, women 
possess equality if not authority; in public life, however, they are very much left behind, except in . 
the L WU as their own domain. Men run the country, but women manage the economy and the 
welfare of the country (Manivone 1994:7). 
Women in the economy: Women play a major role in the economy and tend to have their own 
economic sphere. They constitute 60% of the labor force in agriculture; between 60% and 73% in 
handicrafts; 50% each in trade, public health and education; 25% in the public sector; and 20% in 
industry. 63% of microenterprises are run by women. Over 60% of them are home-based. The 
average employment size is 1.8 including the owner. On the whole, differences between women's 
and men's enterprises are not pronounced in Laos, except for a predominance of women in trade 
and crafts. In agriculture, men are more likely to perform the heavier and women the more 
tedious tasks. Men are in charge of subsistence production, while women produce the cash crops 
and sell any surplus on the market. 
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Box 5: The role of women in microfinance 
"Money seldom stays in the pockets of men for long, it has a way of disappearing much more quickly than if it 
was kept by women. Maybe men like to spend their money on cigarettes and drinks or other types of 
entertainment whereas women think more about the needs of the family and children." Mr. Bounbung, Village 
Chief, Xiengkeo Village, Xieng Khouang Province, quoted in UNICEF 1995: 84) 
"Women are generally good at financial management and accounting because of their social and economic 
·experience in managing the household finances and the local economy: they are the sellers, buyers, traders, 
middle-women and entrepreneurs." (Schenk-Sandbergen & Choulamany-Khamphoui 1995: 91) 
"Men never take part in Lin Huey (an informal rotating savings and credit association)." (From a conversation 
on the Morning Market in Vientiane) 
Before their formalization nearly all currency exchange shops were owned and managed by women, with daily 
transactions between US$ 5-20,000. These women-bankers had access to the formal banking services and, in 
tum, provided financial services to the public. Sizes of loans granted by these women reportedly ranged from 
$500 to $40,000 at interest rates of 5-7% per month and in some cases up to 5% per week. (Viravong 1994: 8) 
When attending a meeting of a loan officer, a proverbially barefoot banker, of the Agricultural Promotion Bank 
with 82 loan applicants in a small village in Vientiane Province, it was noted that the majority of participants 
were women; while, according to the records of the sub-branch, 95% of program loans go to male group 
members in their role as household heads. 
Demand for microfinance: In the cultural tradition of Laos money is usually entrusted to women, 
not men. Women are responsible for cash income and expenditure within the family. As family 
bankers, they are in charge of saving and the self-financing of microenterprises. They are also in 
charge of loan repayment, even though men may be the legal borrowers. Women are more 
reluctant than men to take loans; and they are also more likely to be barred from access to loans. 
Women's first need is for convenient savings deposit facilities. There is a limited need for small 
loans with short maturities and regular installments. With the growth of their income-generating 
activities and their repayment capacity, the demand for loans of increasing size and duration is 
likely to increase. Combined collection services for savings and loan installments would greatly 
enhance their financial capacities. 
Supply ofmicrofinance: Women form about half the labor force in the expanding banking sector, 
though mostly in lower positions. Yet they are poorly served by the banks. Banks fail to provide 
the much-needed deposit facilities and practically exclude women from access to credit in many 
spheres, including most preferential credit programs. Most currency exchange shops, which until 
1994 belonged to the nonformal financial sector, are owned and run by women; they also lend to 
women entrepreneurs at real market rates of interest, ranging from 5-20% per month. The 
semiformal financial sector is dominated by women, who form the bulk of the membership of the 
1650 Lao Village Credit Associations. With support from numerous donors, most of them were 
set up through local women's groups under the L WU, which is considered the best organized 
development organization with the widest delivery network in Laos. What might be emerging 
here is an infrastructure of women's microfinance institutions, which so far have been 
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administered by a hierarchy of local government and village committees. In informal finance, 
women play an almost exclusive role. There is a small number of moneylenders who are mostly 
women. In the urban microeconomy women have been the financial innovators in recent years, 
setting up rotating and nonrotating savings and credit associations: the microbusinesswoman's 
informal self-help bank. 
Assessment: On the demand side, microfinance in Laos is largely a women's affair. It is women 
who are in charge of cash crop production and market sales. Women are the family bankers, 
holding the family purse, doing the saving and repaying any loans. There is a widespread cultural 
pattern in Laos that money can be entrusted to women, not men. 
On the supply side, there is a wide discrepancy in terms of women's involvement between formal 
and nonformal finance, which are both at the beginning of a phase of rapid expansion. The formal 
financial institutions, among them the state-owned banks with their preferential credit programs, 
are run by men and cater to a mainly male market segment. They largely ignore the demand of 
either men or women for deposit facilities. Their potential for linkages with the emerging groups 
and institutions in the nonformal financial sector is yet to be explored. 
The nonformal financial sector is firmly in women's hands. There is an incipient semiformal 
financial sector, comprising 1650 Lao Village Credit Associations of mostly women's groups 
under the L WU, which works closely with government and donor agencies. They are still in a 
rudimentary state, serving as revolving fund channels for specific program activities. With proper 
capacity building inputs and the establishment of their own regulatory authority, they might 
evolve into a network of semiformal local financial intermediaries. Owned and managed by 
women, they might mobilize their own resource and finance part of their own expansion. The 
emphasis would thus be on institution-building, not credit-channeling. 
Informal finance, comprising moneylenders and a small but growing number of urban savings 
and credit associations, has been a women's domain. With some assistance, they might spread 
rapidly as the microbusinesswomen's informal self-help bank. After some improvements in the 
legal environment, they might eventually be upgraded to the level of credit cooperatives, finance 
companies or local shareholders' banks. The emphasis would thus be on institution-building and 
not primarily on bank linkages with the objective of credit channeling. 
7 Conclusions and Recommendations 
The search for a uniquely Laotian system of microfinance: Every country needs its own system of 
microfinance, comprising two types of institutions: networks of viable local microfinance 
institutions with sustainable microsavings, microcredit and microinsurance services for all 
segments of the population; and national or regional banks, either as retailers with their own 
competing microfinance services, or as wholesalers providing deposit facilities and access to 
refinance to local microfinance institutions. Depending on the state of development of a country, 
such institutions may fall into the formal, semiformal or informal financial sector. Laos, like 
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every other country, has its own cultural, socioeconomic and political background. Therefore, the 
system of microfinance cannot be simply transferred from abroad; nor is it feasible to directly 
replicate any project design or approach, no matter how successful it might have been elsewhere. 
Limitations and opportunities of microfinance in Laos: Laos is a sparsely populated small 
country. Its population is dispersed over a large number of tiny villages. Dependency on 
subsistence agriculture, poor social and physical infrastructure, lack of market integration and 
widespread poverty are among the factors that set the limits within which the system of 
microfinance might develop. The role of women as family bankers, a strong sense of solidarity 
within the community and the traditional practice of participatory decision-making at the 
grassroots level are among the factors that create opportunities for an evolving system of 
microfinance. 
A savings-driven system of microfinance built on solidarity: In this setting, what most people 
need more than anything else are facilities to accumulate savings in financial and nonfinancial 
form. They will use these savings to self-finance household needs and income-generating 
activities, and to provide for social obligations and emergencies. The savings may also be used 
for small loans within the community. What might emerge here is· a savings-driven system of 
microfinance with basic microsavings, microinsurance and microcredit services. If the cultural 
traditions of Laos are to be respected, women will play a decisive role in microfinance; decisions 
over microfinance strategies and institutions will be reached participatively at the local level; and 
microfinance services will reinforce the existing networks of solidarity. This system can be 
strengthened from inside and supported from outside; but in the foreseeable future it cannot be 
supplanted, neither by banks nor by NGO projects. 
Creating a demand-oriented policy and legal environment: Within the last ten years, the 
Government, with support from the Communist party, has taken bold steps to transform the 
former command economy into a market economy. Retaining its political stability, it abolished 
price controls in favor of market prices; deregulated trade, foreign exchange and interest rates; 
created a banking system; provided a new legal framework including a banking law and, more 
recently, a law for credit cooperatives; tightened the budget and stabilized the national currency. 
This has created a policy environment for a system of microfinance which is driven by market 
forces and the demand of the people rather than administrative imposition. 
With policy decisions made in a top-down fashion, there have been delays and shortcomings in 
their implementation at the administrative, institutional and local level. E.g., while lending rates 
of interest have been freed by the central bank, state banks have hesitated to charge interest rates 
that cover their costs, resulting in heavy losses, failure to mobilize their own resources and 
continued dependency on state funding. There are also imperfections in the legal framework, 
which has yet to offer of full range of forms of legal status for competing microfinance 
institutions, such as village or shareholding banks and finance companies in addition to credit 
cooperatives. There is also no system of guidance and supervision for the emerging microfinance 
projects and institutions. 
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Box 6: Undermining APB's viability with cheap credit 
A sub-branch of the Agricultural Promotion Bank (see Box 2) has no benefit from the business relationship with 
a small farmer like Mr. Sadome (see Box 1). As the costs of its loans are far above the revenue earned from 
interest payments, it loses money with every transaction. At the same time, there is no incentive to raise its own 
funds, as the costs of mobilizing savings are above the income from loans. One of the results is that the sub-
branch cannot afford to offer savings collection services. Instead, it relies on the allocation of government and 
donor funds through its headoffice. In the end, its services remain restricted. Mr. Sadome does not receive the 
full range of services he would require, such as savings collection services at doorsteps and access to a range of 
loans for any profitable investment, while most people in the area have no access whatsoever to banking services. 
The result: savings go uncollected, loans remain undelivered, investments are missed. The market remains 
constrained; growth is impeded. 
Building a system of viable financial institutions with sustainable services for all: What is needed 
in Laos is not a myriad of credit-driven projects and programs as they may ultimately prevent the 
emergence of self-sustained local financial intermediaries. Instead, a system of microfinance 
needs to be put in place, comprising viable microfinance institutions with sustainable financial 
services for all segments of the population including the poor. On the basis of our discussions and 
observations in Laos, we tentatively conclude that such a system might consist of the following 
components. 
(1) Establishing a microfinance section in the central bank: 
At the central bank level, BOL might set up a microfinance section with the following 
tasks: 
establishing a policy dialogue with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, 
and, with bottom-up participation, 
creating an appropriate policy and legal framework for microfinance; 
introducing sound microfinance practices and microfinance institution-building as a 
new subject in its training of trainers program, and 
opening its Bank Training Centre to participants from L WU, donor projects and 
NGOs; finally, 
establishing second-tier regulatory authorities that will be in charge of guidance and 
supervision of competing networks of micro finance institutions. 
(2) Strengthening commercial banks as retailers and wholesalers of microfinance: 
The state commercial banks, particularly APB, may play an important but limited role as 
retailers, and a larger role as wholesalers, of microfinance services. Five strategies may be 
examined that might greatly enhance their effectiveness: 
an incentives strategy geared at institutional viability: 
converting branches and sub-branches into profit centers that mobilize their own 
resources and provide credit at their own risk; with personal incentives to manage-
ment and staff that optimize their motivation; with business-oriented women in 
leadership positions; and with incentives to borrowers for timely repayment; 
a sound banking strategy geared at the sustainability of financial services: 
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offering attractive savings products; providing credit products with appropriately 
short maturities and instalment periods; determining lending rates of interest to 
cover the costs of each product from the margin; offering microinsurance as part of 
their resource mobilization and loan protection; offering reciprocal products with a 
savings, credit and insurance components and tied doorstep collection services; 
a linkage strategy geared at microfinance wholesaling and networking: 
providing deposit facilities and refinance to self-help groups and nonformal 
financial institutions; collaborating with local groups and institutions as agents 
collecting savings and instalments on their behalf; 
an outreach strategy geared at economies of scale: 
extending the banks' services to women according to their share in the economy; and 
to more men as heads of households and microentrepreneurs - in each case accord-
ing to their capacity to save, borrow, invest and repay; 
a transformation strategy geared at decentralization: 
converting selected sub-branches· into autonomous financial institutions owned and 
managed by local women and men. 
In each case, one or several branches or sub-branches may be selected to first test the 
strategy and then serve as an exposure training site for other branches and institutions. At 
this point there is no indication that the private and foreign banks might play a significant 
role in microfinance. 
(3) Establishing a network of women's village banks for all: 
The semiformal financial sector in Laos is dominated by women organized in the L WU, 
which comprises over half the adult female population and disposes of a mobilization and 
delivery network reaching effectively down into every village. L WU is considered the 
best-organized development organization in Laos. In close cooperation with donors, 
government agencies and international NGOs, it has been instrumental in establishing 
most of the 1,650 existing Lao Village Credit Associations, LVCA. So far the LVCAs 
have served as revolving funds channels for a variety of program purposes; they have not 
functioned as financial intermediaries. L WU now faces a double challenge: 
first, of converting the financial activities of its local women's groups into self-
reliant, viable informal financial intermediaries with sustainable financial services 
to the community; and, 
second, at a later point in time, of upgrading them to the level of semiformal 
financial institutions with an appropriate legal status. 
In this vein, L WU is the only organization that has the potential of spreading a network of 
autonomous local financial institutions all over Laos. Given its status as an official mass 
organization, it may also obtain the mandate to vigorously pursue this course. L WU may 
thus play a crucial role in the emergence of the system of microfinance in Laos. However, 
L WU is not anything like a financial institution. It completely lacks the required technical 
competence and financial management skills. A massive capacity-building input would be 
required to enable L WU to effectively approach this task. Two operational strategies 
towards this goal may be examined: 
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- the establishment of a subsidiary which would be solely in charge of local financial 
institution-building; 
- and the establishment of close collaboration with a bilateral association or interna-
tional network experienced in the building of local financial institutions and their 
networks, including the establishment of its own autonomous regulatory authority. 
Similarly, the local women's groups lack the expertise of running a financial institution. 
Three operational steps might be required: 
- first, establishing a separate financial institution at the village level, with a member-
ship that differs from that of the women's group; 
second, transferring all financial decision-making authority from the village 
committee to the management and staff of the financial institution (thus separating 
the political and community development concerns of the village committee from 
the institution's concern for its financial viability and sustainability); 
third, training the institution's personnel in financial management. 
Given the traditional role of women as family bankers and their prominent place in 
informal finance, these institutions might, on principle, be entrusted to the ownership and 
management of local women. Depending on the local situation in terms of solidarity of 
the sexes within the family and the village community and in terms of sexual labor 
division, which puts men in charge of subsistence production and women in charge of 
cash crops and finance, men may be included as owners and managers of the emerging 
village banks. It is expected that men will have access to these village banks as customers. 
Within this subsystem of microfinance, the main function of men might be that of 
facilitators in the national and administrative hierarchy. 
Donor contributions to the development of microfinance in Laos may be particularly 
effective in the following ways: 
- as technical assistance for training and capacity-building of L WU, its financial 
institutions subsidiary and its regional and local institutions; 
as financial assistance in the form of equity contributions (not revolving funds!) to 
the emerging local financial intermediaries. 
(4) Spreading microbusinesswomen's informal self-help banks: 
Informal financial institutions are just emerging in Laos. They are mainly of two types: 
individual moneylenders, found in small numbers throughout the country, and savings and 
credit associations which are presently spreading in the urban informal economy. Both 
institutions seem to be firmly in the hands of women. The rotating and nonrotating 
savings and credit assoc1at1ons have the potential of growing into the 
microbusinesswomen's informal self-help bank. With some technical assistance to 
increase their outreach and spread their best practices, many women and men in the 
microenterprise sector may greatly benefit from their financial services. Some form of 
voluntary registration might pave the way for official recognition, linkages with other 
financial institutions and, eventually, for the acquisition of an appropriate legal status. 
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Women - the community bankers of Laos? Outside the formal sector, women play a prominent 
role in microfinance in Laos. This is based on deeply entrenched cultural traditions: Women are 
in charge of cash crops and market sales; they finance their own microenterprises; they are the 
holders of the family purse, do the saving and repay any loans; and they are prominent in the few 
existing informal financial institutions. Money is entrusted to women, not men. Most adult 
women in Laos are organized in the L WU, which has the potential of establishing a system of 
local micro finance institutions throughout the country. All the evidence thus points in one 
direction: that women have the potential of becoming the country's community bankers, owning 
and managing the emerging local financial institutions. Within the cultural tradition of harmony 
and solidarity, the decision is of course left, in each community, to women in dialogue with their 
men and those in power to decide whether men are accepted among the owners and managers of 
an institution; that men may deposit their savings there; and at what terms and conditions they 
may have access to loans. 
Shaping the system of microfinance for all: What is presently emerging in Laos is a differentiated 
system of microfinance: with banks run by men, providing credit to a predominantly male 
clientele - with the potential of extending their outreach to women; and with small local financial 
institutions in the hands of women, providing microfinancial services to all segments of the 
population. It is up to the policymakers and the results of their dialogue with the women and men 
at the local level to decide which course the system of microfinance is to take in the future. 
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Annex 1: Population Density by Province, Lao PDR 
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Annex 2: Social Indicators, Lao PDR 
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Demographic 
Annual Average Population Growth(%) 1980-85 1885-95 2.5 2.4 
Children(< 15 years) to Total Population(%) 1985 1993 44.2 45.4 
Crude Birth Rate (births per 1,000 population) 1970 1985 1994 44 46 43 
Crude Death Rate (deaths per 1,000 population) 1970 1985 1994 23 17 15 
Total Fertility Rate (average children per woman) 1970 1985 1993 6.1 6.4 6.8 c 
Age Dependency Ratio (per 100 population) 1960 1985 1994 80.0 93.3 92.7 
2. Health and Nutrition 
Life Expectancy at Birth (years) 1982 1987 1992 43.0 48.0 51.0 
Female 1982 1987 1992 45.0 50.0 52.5 
Male 1982 1987 1992 42.0 47.0 49.5 
Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live births) 1970 1993 146 125 
Infants with low Birth Weight(%< 2.5 kg.) 1990 18 
Under - 5 Mortality Rate 1982 1993 184 182 
Malnourished Under - 5s (%) 1984 1994 35 40 
Maternal Mortality Rate (per 100,000 live births) 1993 656 
Per Capita Daily Calorie Supply 1992 2,259 
Population with Access to Health Services(%) 1985-87 1988-93 67 67 
Public Health Expenditure (as per cent of GDP) 1960 1990 0.5 1.0 
3. Education 
Adult Literacy Rate (%) 1970 1992 33.0 53.5 
Female 1970 1992 28.0 40.9 
Primary School Net Enrollment Ratio (%) 1980 1990 1993 54.0 64.3 69.9 
Primary School Gross Enrollment Ratio(%) 1980 1990 1993 104.0 104.8 110.4 
Female 1990 1993 93.3 97.8 
Secondary School Gross Enrollment Ratio 1980 1985 1993 17.7 19.2 23.0 
Female 1980 1985 1993 13.7 16.4 18.2 
Mean Years of Schooling (age> 25 years) 1980 1992 2.5 2.9 
Female 1980 1992 1.9 2.1 
Male 1980 1992 3.1 3.6 
Public Expenditure on Education 
as per cent of GDP 1988 1990 1994 1.3 1.4 2.2 
as per cent of Total Public Expenditure 1988 1990 1994 4.4 5.9 9.4 
4. Socioeconomic and Environment. Context 
Per Capita GDP ($) 1989 1994 179 336 
Real Per Capita GDP (PPP$) 1987 1989 1992 1000 1025 1760 
Poverty incidence(% of total population) 1992/93 46.0 
Labor Force Participation Rate(% of 16-60 years old) 1985 1990 1992 89.7 91.2 91.5 
Female 1985 1990 1992 90.2 92.2 92.6 
Unemployment Rate 1985 1992 3.0 3.0 
Population Density (persons per km2) 1980 1985 1995 14 15 19 
Population with Access to Safe Water Supply(%) 1985-87 1988-93 21 36 
Urban 1988-93 28 54 
Rural 1988-93 20 33 
Population with Access to Sanitation (%) 1985-87 1988-93 10 21 
Urban 1988-93 28 97 
Rural 1988-93 6 8 
Annual Deforestation Rate (%) 1980-90 0.9 
Source: ADB 1996: 41 
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Annex 3: Economic Indicators, Lao PDR 
Real GDP Growth Rate (in%) 7.1 
Nominal GDP (in B Kip) 1,395.0 
Nominal GDP (in MUS$) 1,516 
Nominal GDP per capita (in US$) 350 
Inflation Rate (end-year) 17.7 10.4 6.0 9.0 6.7 25.7 
Liquidity (end-year, in B Kip) 46.9 51.3 76.5 125.8 166.0 193.3 
Money 27.5 28.2 35.2 52.2 61.3 67.2 
Quasi-money 19.4 23.1 41.3 73.6 104.7 126.1 
Liquidity Growth (end-year, in%) 14.4 9.4 49.1 64.4 32.0 16.4 
Money 9.6 2.5 24.8 48.3 17.4 9.6 
Quasi-money 21.2 19.1 78.8 78.2 42.3 20.4 
Exchange Rate (end-year, buy., Kip per$) 
Parallel Market 698 727 720 720 726 936 
Official Market 695 711 715 716 718 920 
Net Foreign Capital Inflow (in MUS$) 55.8 9.6 56.2 111.5 106.6 203.3 
Long-term loans 49.8 35.1 62.1 69.5 55.7 109.2 
Short-term loans -33.5 -14.9 -35.8 7.5 10.2 
Foreign investment 6.0 8.0 9.0 77.8 43.4 83.9 
External Assistance Inflow (in MUS$) 175 132.6 134.0 181.3 188.7 232.5 
Long-term loans 47.1 71.1 77.8 64.0 123.2 
Grants 85.5 62.9 103.5 124.7 109.3 
Foreign Investment Approved (in M US$) 58 1,586 328 355 2,598 615 
Government Expenditure 
(in MUS$) 199.2 209.9 266.8 236.8 359.5 319.6 
(in B Kip) 143.4 151.1 192.1 170.5 266.7 294.0 
Government Revenue (in B Kip) 61.0 74.7 93.5 113.3 143.6 165.7 
Budget Deficit, excluding grants (in B Kip) 82.4 76.4 98.6 72.9 123.1 128.3 
As%ofGDP 13.4 10.6 11.7 7.7 11.1 9.2 
Outstanding Off. Ext. Debt (end-year, MUS$) 1,043 1,078 1,148 1,202 1,393 1,236 
Debt Service Ratio1 (in%) 10.3 11.2 6.3 4.6 4.5 4.7 
Gross International Reserves (end-year, M $) 64.8 57.2 81.2 150.9 158.2 191.1 
BOP Current Deficit (in M US$) 
Including Official Transfers 78.1 25.0 41.1 42.6 106.3 91.7 
Excluding Official Transfers 101.5 110.5 104.0 146.1 231.0 201.0 
As%ofGDP 11.8 11.0 8.9 11.0 15.0 13.3 
Imports (in million US$) 202 215 265 432 564 587 
Export (in million US$) 79 97 133 240 300 348 
Debt service payments as proportion of exports of goods and non-factor services 
Source: Reyes 1996: 13 
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Annex 4: Structure and Project Implementation Strategy of the Lao Women's Union 
work together with 
Other ministrie:.s-----------------1 
supervise 
Province Committee 
• deputy governor 
• Department of 
- agriculture 
- education build a committee to2ether 
- health at the provincial level 
- cooperation planning 
- finance 
• youth organization etc. 
District committee 
• deputy governor 
• Department of 
- agriculture 
- education 
- health 
- finance 
build a committee to2ether 
at the district level 
• youth organization etc. 
Village committee 
• LWU volunteers 
• village head etc. !Village Committ. 1--"...lil.5'-1-hlil.''-' -< 
(3-5 people) 
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CentralLWU ~ 
Provincial L WU 
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& 
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Annex 5: Outreach of Donor-financed Projects to Lao Village Credit Associations 
Nongovernmental Organizations 
ADRA Vientiane Municipality 112 325 
CARE Khammouane 500 2,270 
Sayaboury 149 765 
CAA Vientiane Province 14 12 
Saravane 4 1 
Sekong 2 1 
Concern Champassak 4 3 
Bokeo 5 12 
Xieng K.houang 11 3 
Savannakhet 13 3 
Consortium Sayaboury 26 25 
Vientiane Province 15 3 
Luang Prabang 29 49 
cuso Vientiane Province 2 13 
Ox/am Belgium Savannakhet 4 8 
" Xieng K.houang 2 9 
MCC Phongsaly 26 11 
QSL Luang Prabang n.a. n.a. 
Oudomsay n.a. n.a. 
Xieng Khouapg n.a. n.a. 
SCFA Bolikhamsai 301 n.a. 
Sayaboury 51 86 
World Concern Luang Namtha 3 30 
World Vision Champassak 20 n.a. 
Xieng Khouang 6 n.a. 
ZOA Vientiane Municipality 2 5 
Luang Namtha 11 43 
Xieng Khouang 7 112 
Multilateral Organizations 
DDS Saysoboum 14 100 
/FAD Xieng K.houang n.a. 715 
UNCDF Sayaboury 6 12 
Oudomsay 9 16 
UNICEF Champassak 91 44 
Khammouane 85 64 
Savannakhet 117 42 
Xieng Khouang 92 45 
Houaphan 104 42 
Source: UNDPIUNCDF 1996 
1 Data according to the Bolikhamsai IVD Project Jan-June 1996 Report (Draft) of SCF A ( l 996b ). 
2 The Data for Xieng Khouang are for 1995 (cf. ZOA 1994). 
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